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Abstract 
In 1990, Kentucky passed the Kentucky Education Reform Act (KERA) in 
response to a State Supreme Court mandate regarding educational spending inequality 
across rich and poor school districts. A comprehensive bill, KERA completely altered the 
existing school funding system, and instituted a number of accountability and curricular 
changes. More specifically, KERA effectively equalized per pupil funding across 
Kentucky school districts, pulling a majority of both low-spending and poor districts up 
to what had been higher spending quartiles. Economic theory suggests such a dramatic 
transformation in school finance has the potential to increase income heterogeneity 
within districts, which may, in turn, improve the educational and economic outcomes of 
those previously segregated. 
 This honors thesis examines whether KERA significantly decreased residential 
income segregation across school districts. Differing from existing research, I focus on 
one of the most comprehensive reforms in history and its subsequent impact on 
residential sorting patterns. Using a difference-in-difference regression technique, I find 
that KERA had no effect on the household poverty rate across districts when compared to 
Tennessee. These results are robust through a number of different specifications. 
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 1 
Introduction 
In 1989, the Kentucky Supreme Court found Kentucky’s public education system 
unconstitutional, declaring that the “General Assembly has fallen short of its duty to 
enact legislation to provide for an efficient system of common schools throughout the 
state” (Rose v. Council for Better Education, 1989). A year later, the General Assembly 
passed the Kentucky Education Reform Act (KERA), considered the largest attack yet on 
the constitutionality of a state education system (Adams & White, 1997). One of the most 
studied aspects of KERA is its effect on per pupil spending across Kentucky districts. 
Research suggests KERA dramatically affected expenditure levels – most importantly 
equalizing, but also increasing per pupil spending across all districts.
1
 
While much attention has been devoted to KERA’s effect on school finance and 
student achievement outcomes, I know of no analysis focusing on KERA’s impact 
beyond these two realms. It is well known that public education plays an important role 
in housing, as public schools have traditionally been funded through local property taxes 
and school quality is capitalized in the housing and rental markets.
2
 Additionally, there 
exists a theoretical and empirical literature that analyzes school finance reform’s effects 
on household incentives to segregate based on income. The theory suggests that a 
dramatic school funding equalization scheme, such as KERA, will decrease a 
household’s incentive to sort by income, resulting in a decreased percentage of 
households below the poverty line in initially poor or low-spending districts. Such a 
change in neighborhood concentration carries the potential to improve the economic and 
                                                 
1
 See Adams (1994); Adams and White (1997); Clark (2003); and Hoyt (1999) 
2
 See Brunner et al. (2002); Dee (2000); Loubert (2005); and Oates (1969) 
 2 
educational outcomes of those segregated.
3
 The empirical studies analyzing reform and 
residential sorting, however, are limited and weak. Since the empirical evidence linking 
reform to resorting is so insignificant, it is prudent to study a substantial and 
comprehensive school finance reform individually. Indeed, if analysis of a specific 
reform finds a significant impact on income segregation, stronger conclusions may be 
drawn regarding the indirect effects of school finance reform. 
In the following paper, I examine the impact of KERA on residential income 
segregation, measured by the percent of households below poverty within school 
districts. Specifically, I implement a difference-in-differences regression analysis across 
school districts, using Tennessee districts as a control group. My findings suggest that 
KERA did not significantly impact residential income segregation across districts. Some 
empirical weaknesses, however, remain. The findings, nevertheless, are the first state-
specific results and provide much-needed insight into the residential effects of school 
finance reform. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The first section briefly 
overviews the Kentucky Education Reform Act. The second outlines the existing 
literature regarding school finance reform and residential segregation, while the third 
section details the economic theory behind such a relationship. The fourth section 
introduces my empirical measurements and provides initial analysis, and the fifth section 
reviews and discusses the results of my estimations. The paper ends with a brief 
conclusion outlining the findings and limitations of my research. 
 
                                                 
3
 Peer and neighborhood effects have been shown to significantly impact educational and economic 
outcomes (Hoxby, 2000; Ioannides & Loury, 2004). 
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The Kentucky Education Reform Act (KERA) 
 Known as “the nation’s first experiment with comprehensive education reform”, 
KERA not only addressed school finance discrepancies, but also implemented new 
policies directed at school governance and classroom curricular reform (Clark, 2003).
4
 
Specifically, KERA shifted the Kentucky public school curriculum towards a standards-
based assessment system, holding students and schools accountable for meeting or 
exceeding certain measurable performance standards at each grade level. Schools that 
meet improvement goals as measured by the new assessment system collect cash rewards 
for their students’ performance; schools failing to meet the standards must employ 
improvement plans and/or receive financial assistance in addition to outside consulting. 
In regard to governmental reform, KERA allocated more specific curricular and 
instructional responsibility to the school level, while providing the Department of 
Education the power to take over failing schools and districts. 
 In addition to addressing governmental and curricular reform, KERA established 
the Support Education Excellence in Kentucky (SEEK) fund, which aimed to both 
increase funding for schools and equalize per pupil funding across school districts. In 
particular, SEEK provides each district with a yearly base-guarantee sum of money, 
derived from the percentage of students qualifying for the federal school lunch program, 
the percentage of students with disabilities, and the cost of transportation within the 
district. Districts contribute 0.3 percent of their assessed property value per pupil to their 
base-guarantee, while the state provides the difference. Additionally, districts can 
increase their spending per pupil up to 49.5 percent above the base-guarantee (149.5 
percent of the base-guarantee), with the state matching district increases until funding 
                                                 
4
 This section relies heavily on Clark’s (2003) summary of KERA. 
 4 
reaches 115 percent of the base-guarantee. This matching policy seeks to provide 
incentives for poorer districts to increase funding, as no matching funds are provided for 
districts with assessed property value per pupil equal to or greater than 1.5 times the 
statewide average. 
Literature Review 
School Finance and Property Values 
There are two conditions that must hold for KERA to affect residential income 
segregation. First, school finance reform must affect property values. Research regarding 
local public good capitalization suggests that it does. Specifically, reform changes a 
locally-determined public good into a state-equalized local public good, which can 
dramatically alter residential sorting incentives. The seminal Tiebout (1956) model 
identifies this relationship between households’ choices and local property taxes, 
asserting that households will choose where to live based on the with-tax price and the 
relative quality of local public goods, settling in a community where the marginal benefit 
of public goods consumption is equal to the marginal cost. In particular, along with local 
taxes, property values reflect the quality of local public goods, as they are bid up when 
households move to districts receiving increases in funding and bid down when districts 
experience decreases. 
Many studies have applied Tiebout’s theory to public education, resulting in 
empirical evidence that supports Tiebout’s hypothesis. Oates’ groundbreaking paper 
(1969) uses per pupil spending as a proxy for local public good quality and finds that 
property values in the Northeast have a significant positive relationship with expenditure 
per pupil. In more recent studies, Loubert (2005) similarly discovers the existence of 
 5 
school-based premiums in the Texas housing market after finance reform, while Brunner 
et al. (2002) concludes that housing values rose when the 1971 Serrano v. Priest ruling 
increased school spending in California. 
Dee (2000) expands the scope of study by applying the Tiebout hypothesis to 
court-ordered school finance reform across the nation. Specifically, Dee compares states 
that experienced an exogenous shock of court-ordered finance reform to other states that 
had not undergone court-ordered reform, finding a relationship between reform, an 
increase in resources devoted to poorer districts, and an increase in housing values in 
those districts. Dee’s results not only imply that an increase in school aid is capitalized in 
the housing market, but that (at least as perceived by households) funding levels affect 
school quality. 
Residential Sorting 
The second condition required for reform to affect residential income segregation 
is the existence of residential income sorting incentives. In particular, household 
preferences or incomes must differ in order for sorting to occur. Generally, these 
incentives can be classified into two main categories: public sector incentives and non-
public sector incentives (Nechyba, 2002). Westhoff (1977) identifies local income tax as 
a sorting motivation, where households are assumed to have homogeneous tastes but 
heterogeneous incomes. In this model’s equilibrium, differences in local public goods 
provided by the income tax are attributable to the variation of household incomes. Epple 
et al. (1993) incorporate local property taxes and conclude that under specific 
assumptions, income heterogeneity still explains the variation in property tax-funded 
public goods levels across jurisdictions. Thus, both Westhoff (1977) and Epple et al. 
 6 
(1993) find that when household income varies, public sector determinants (income and 
property taxes) are an income-segregating force across jurisdictions (Nechyba, 2002). 
The simplest non-public sector sorting incentive is heterogeneity in household 
utility functions based on income. In other words, households that differ in willingness to 
pay for public goods as income varies will segregate themselves into certain communities 
dependent on these tastes. Property heterogeneity also provides motivation for 
households to sort via income (Nechyba, 1997).
5
 Inputs in the school quality production 
function, if dependent on residential income sorting, can also lead to residential 
segregation. Specifically, research demonstrates that peer inputs, such as peer ability and 
parental involvement, increase with household income.
6
 Thus, school quality, which is 
partially dependent on peer inputs, provides another incentive for households to sort via 
income.
 7
 
School Finance and Residential Sorting 
Empirical research suggests that both conditions discussed above hold, which 
implies school finance reform should decrease residential income segregation. The 
empirical relationship between reform and poverty concentrations, however, is 
surprisingly weak. Aaronson (1999) studies court-ordered reform across the United States 
                                                 
5
 Nechyba (1997) models residential decisions in a heterogeneous housing market and concludes that the 
variation in the housing market is a segregating force – regardless of local tax characteristics. Nechyba 
(2002) attributes these findings to the inelasticity of housing market supply assumed in the model. 
6
 Research finds peer ability is correlated with parental income (Solon, 1992; Zimmerman 1992), and that 
wealthy parents are more likely to monitor (McMillan, 1999) and contribute their own resources to their 
schools (Brunner and Sonstelie, 1999). 
7
 Bayer et al. (2004) incorporate neighborhood effects into the school quality definition and estimate that 
the “full effect” of school quality on residential sorting is two times greater than the direct effect, 
suggesting that when the measurement of school quality considers additional neighborhood attributes, its 
existence is pivotal in household residential decisions. 
 7 
and the change in the fraction of poor households within a particular school district.
8
 
Income sorting in states that upheld their existing funding formula is found to 
significantly increase, while sorting decreases in states that underwent equalizing reform, 
although not significantly. Relative to wealthy districts, low-income districts are more 
likely to experience sorting movement as a result of reform. Aaronson’s results support 
the theory that poor districts will become more economically integrated when undergoing 
finance reform. His findings, however, remain weak and largely “suggestive,” leading 
Aaronson to discuss the need for further future work to address endogeneity issues 
concerning school quality, funding, and private school options. 
In their unpublished work, Downes and Figlio (1999b) identify and address a 
number of weaknesses in Aaronson’s study and find expected directions of reform-
induced resorting (Downes and Figlio 1999a).
9
 Unlike Aaronson, the authors analyze the 
dynamics within low-spending districts (not low-income districts), finding reform 
relatively decreases the poverty rates within such districts. Although the authors find a 
consistent “qualitative” relationship between reform and a reduction in the incentive to 
sort by income, the relationship is not always significant. 
In his general equilibrium model and subsequent simulation of reform’s impact on 
income segregation, Nechyba (1997, 2003) addresses some of the specification problems 
                                                 
8
 Lamm (2001) conducts a similar analysis, concluding reform has a small, but significant effect on 
integration. As in Aaronson (1999), Lamm stresses caution in the interpretation of her findings, due to 
empirical model specification problems. 
9
 Specifically, Downes and Figlio (1999a) highlight three main points of weakness in Aaronson’s study that 
may have affected the results. First, a significant number of the reforms Aaronson focuses on were enacted 
very close to the base year in the data sample and therefore, may understate the true impact of reform on 
sorting. Second, Aaronson groups school districts by differences in income (the fraction of poor households 
within a certain district), not per pupil funding. Since school finance reform can have differential impacts 
based on initial district per pupil spending, Downes and Figlio argue that variables should be interacted 
with initial values of per pupil spending, not district income levels. Third, Aaronson applies a simplistic 
view of the education demand function, focusing only on one input (income). Downes and Figlio assert that 
parental education level is also strongly correlated with the demand for education, and thus should be 
included in the analysis. 
 8 
acknowledged by Aaronson (peer effects and the existence of private schools). Nechyba 
defines school quality as a function of per pupil spending and average peer quality, where 
peer quality is determined by a child’s educational ability and the parent’s income level. 
Incorporating private schools into a household’s decision process by assuming a perfectly 
competitive private school market, Nechyba runs simulations with and without private 
schools. Nechyba finds small decreases in residential income segregation under more 
centralized funding, while the existence of a perfectly competitive private school market 
results in dramatic desegregation. These results suggest private schools play an important 
role in determining the level of income segregation across communities and that school 
finance reform may only have a weak impact on residential sorting. 
A review of the sparse empirical literature reveals weak and insignificant findings 
regarding the effect of school finance reform on residential income sorting. The studies 
analyzing past reforms are conducted at the national level and thus generalize all types of 
reform into broad categories, such as court-ordered reform or legislative-mandated 
reform.
10
 Such groupings fail to capture the size and magnitude of each state equalization 
scheme, which may contribute to the weak and generally inconclusive results discussed 
above.
11
 By isolating and analyzing a single state’s finance equalization scheme, one can 
hopefully determine a specific reform’s impact on residential sorting within that state.12 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Aaronson (1999), Downs & Figlio (1999b), and Lamm (2001). 
11
 In other words, national studies that generalize reforms into broad categories assume that the variance of 
the independent variable (reform) is zero, when in reality many reforms entail state-specific policies or 
have varying success at equalizing funding. 
12
 Downes and Figlio (1999a) identify omission of reforms’ characteristics as a limitation of their study, 
they are unable to do so because they include state-specific fixed effects in their estimation. 
 9 
Theory 
A model specifying a household’s residential decision is the first step in analyzing 
the effect of school finance reform on residential income sorting. I assume a household 
will locate in the district in which net benefits are maximized. My theoretical approach is 
a discrete choice framework loosely based on Barrow (2000), who examines the 
monetary value placed on school quality by households. In her analysis, Barrow assigns a 
functional form to utility (multinomial logistic), whereas I deal here with general 
representations of household utility. 
Household Location Decision 
 In choosing a residence, households are assumed to maximize their net benefits of 
locating in one district versus another, subtracting the total monetary cost of living in a 
certain location from the total monetized utility generated from living in that area. 
Specifically, a household maximizes utility, U, by choosing a school district so that 
iU > jU ; for all districts i, j. In particular, they choose district i if: 
)]*(
),(
[)]*(
),(
[ Ht
privcsmppubgoodsU
Ht
privcsmppubgoodsU
j
j
i
i 

 (1) 
where   is equal to the marginal utility of income measured in dollars, while Ht *  
represents the total monetary cost of living in a house and is equal to the amount the 
household pays in taxes.
13
 Dividing total household utility by   captures in dollars the 
total utility generated, allowing for the calculation of net monetized utility. 
Since I focus on state-level finance reform, I assume that all national and state 
public goods are independent of the household’s residential decision. With the exception 
                                                 
13
 It is assumed that all households own a house, with H representing the taxable wealth of each housing 
unit. 
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of public school quality, all other district-specific public goods and housing attributes are 
assumed to generate uniform utility across households.
14
 Public school quality therefore 
is crucial in the maximization of household utility. Furthermore, I assume the proportion 
of families with children across districts is constant.
15
 Thus, a household’s utility can be 
represented as a function of district school quality and private consumption, so that the 
household chooses district i if: 
)]*(
),(
[)]*(
),(
[ Ht
privcsmppubschqltyU
Ht
privcsmppubschqltyU
j
jj
i
ii 

, 
ji,  districts   (2) 
Where  Hti *  now equals the amount the household pays in local property taxes. 
School Quality Production Function 
 Similar to Nechyba (2002), I define school quality to be a function of monetary 
and peer inputs.
16
 Research is mixed regarding the effect of funds on school quality, 
however it seems reasonable to assume that many of the commonly-agreed upon factors 
that increase school quality, such as the quality of teachers and the pupil-teacher ratio, 
depend directly on school funding.
17
 Assuming funds are used efficiently and effectively 
                                                 
14
 While it is true the characteristics and size of the housing stock, and costs of living differ across districts, 
I do not expect school finance reform to affect the differentials of housing stock across districts. Thus, this 
assumption should not influence my theoretical outcomes. 
15
 My empirical work focuses at the district level, not the household level. Assuming an equal proportion of 
households with children across districts allows me to ignore differences in sorting incentives between 
households with and without children, something which cannot be analyzed in my empirical examination. 
16
 The research regarding the school quality production function varies widely, suggesting that no precise 
way exists to specify this function. 
17
 In a review of nearly 400 studies, Hanushek (1997) finds no consistent relationship between school 
funding and student achievement. Hanushek attributes these insignificant findings to ineffective and 
inefficient local use of school funds. Card and Krueger (1992) examine specific school quality measures 
and find small pupil/teacher ratios, higher teacher pay, and longer school years positively affect labor-
market outcomes. Similarly, Darling-Hammond (1998) argues that small schools, small class sizes, 
challenging curriculum, and highly-qualified teachers all have been shown to positively affect student 
achievement. Funding level, therefore, is probably a necessary, but not sufficient condition for school 
quality. 
 11 
by school districts allows me to use school funding as a proxy for school quality. The 
relationship between funding and school quality is assumed to be positive and 
demonstrate decreasing marginal returns. Furthermore, I assume the quality of a school is 
also affected by peer inputs, such as peer ability.
18
 Thus, households consider both the 
funds and peers associated with each school district in their residential decision. 
Rewriting Equation (2), allows us to consider a household’s residential decision with 
respect to school funding and peer inputs. The household chooses district i if: 
)]*(
)),,((
[
)]*(
)),,((
[
Ht
privcsmppeerinputsfundingfU
Ht
privcsmppeerinputsfundingfU
j
jjj
i
iii




       , ji,  districts    (3) 
Initial Equilibrium 
 Before reform, an income-segregated residential equilibrium exists, where poor 
and wealthy households reside in different districts due to the segregating forces of the 
school quality inputs and possibly private consumption. Additionally, in the first period, 
school funding is completely localized, where the consumed-to-spent ratio of school 
quality utility to school funds in every district equals some constant.
19
 In other words, 
each district generates and spends all of its school funds through a local property tax. 
Assuming a perfectly competitive housing market, in equilibrium, each household within 
the district maximizes its net monetized utility. In this Pareto optimal condition, no 
household can increase its net monetized utility by moving to another district. Thus, for 
any household, 
                                                 
18
 Hanushek et al. (2003) find that peer achievement positively affects achievement growth, with all 
students benefiting from high-achieving peers. 
19
 I assume the constant is positively related to a household’s utility function. 
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)]*(
)),,((
[
)]*(
)),,((
[
Ht
privcsmppeerinputsfundingfU
Ht
privcsmppeerinputsfundingfU
j
jjj
i
iii




    , ji,  districts (4) 
In this initial equilibrium, stark contrasts between school districts exist, as funding 
depends on local property wealth. When compared to wealthy districts, poor districts 
raise and spend little on schools as a result of their low property tax base. Moreover, 
households in poor districts experience negative peer effects, as most poor households are 
segregated into separate districts. This implies that under the initial equilibrium, poor 
households experience a substantially lower monetized utility from public schooling 
relative to those residing in wealthy districts, as both inputs into the school quality 
function are smaller. More generally, under this equilibrium, the differences between net 
monetized utility across households are explained by both the public and private inputs, 
as poor households consume fewer private goods and inferior public schooling when 
compared to wealthy households. Those who make the case for equity in education focus 
on this discrepancy of public good provision and argue for a more centralized funding 
system. 
School Finance Reform 
 By completely centralizing school finance, reform effectively equalizes the 
funding input in the school quality production function across all districts, reducing the 
number of district-specific public good variables in the monetized utility equation to one 
(See Equation 5).
20
 The exogenous shock of school finance reform on the initial 
equilibrium disrupts a household’s maximization of net monetized utility, as households 
                                                 
20
 Centralization of school finance is defined as the state redistributing the funds generated through local 
property taxes equally per pupil across all districts. 
 13 
are no longer in a Pareto optimal situation. In other words, the net monetized utility of 
living in school district i is not equal to j’s, thus, households move to other districts to 
maximize their net monetized utility. 
)]*(
)),((
[)]*(
)),((
[ Ht
privcsmppeerinputsfU
Ht
privcsmppeerinputsfU
j
jj
i
ii 

, 
ji,  districts  (5) 
Specifically, the consumed-to-spent ratio faced by households living in a poor 
district increases when school finance is centralized, as poor districts experience a growth 
in marginal utility generated from a rise in district public school funding. In other words, 
while poor districts contribute a relatively smaller fraction of total funding for public 
schools, they spend the same amount as wealthy districts on public education. Thus, 
holding private consumption constant, poor districts become more attractive places for 
households to locate, as the net monetized utility in these areas increases.
 21
 
New Equilibrium 
 Households respond to this exogenous finance reform shock by moving until they 
once again maximize their net monetized utility. Because previously poor districts 
contribute relatively less to public education while receiving equal funding (their 
consumed-to-spent ratio increases), wealthy households move to these districts and 
increase the tax bases, which effectively reduces the poor districts’ consumed-to-spent 
ratios.
22
 In contrast, the movement of households from previously wealthy districts 
lowers the wealthy districts’ tax bases, increasing the ratio faced by wealthy districts. A 
                                                 
21
 This increase, however, is dependent on the strength of peer inputs in the school quality production 
function. If peer inputs play a major role in determining school quality, wealthy households may choose to 
stay in wealthy districts as the net monetized utility falls only slightly. 
22
 To avoid a limit on the number of households moving into one district, I assume a perfectly elastic 
housing supply. 
 14 
new equilibrium is reached when all households are living in the district that maximizes 
their net monetized utilities and every district has a consumed-to-spent ratio equal to the 
initial constant. Unlike the initial equilibrium, significant income sorting is required to 
equalize the consumed-to-spent ratio of school quality utility to school funds across all 
districts. 
 While theory suggests income sorting will occur, it does not predict perfect 
income integration. Peer inputs, which may be correlated with household income, are still 
considered in the household’s utility function. Thus, the amount of income integration 
also relies on the relative importance of peer effects in the school quality production 
function. As stated previously, research regarding this function is unclear as to the role 
peer inputs play. Additionally, school finance reform may increase residential income 
integration if households are assumed, during the reform period, to internalize the 
externality generated by income segregation across communities. In other words, if 
households internalize the decreasing returns of having all human capital located in one 
community, the incentive to sort by income is decreased and a less segregated 
equilibrium is reached (Fernandez, 2001). The existence of private schools across 
districts may also increase residential income integration, as wealthy households may 
choose to move to previously poor districts and send their children to a private school.
23
 
Therefore, theory predicts that school finance reform will decrease residential income 
segregation, but to what extent remains unclear. 
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 Nechyba (2002) finds that a perfectly competitive private school market significantly increases the level 
of residential income integration when localized school finance is centralized under reform. 
 15 
Summary Statistics 
In light of theory, an ideal dataset for the examination of KERA’s effect on 
residential segregation would center on household level variables over a longer time 
period (for instance, twenty years). An analysis meeting these requirements allows the 
researcher to observe specific relationships among potential residential decision factors 
within each household as reform is implemented. Additionally, with data at the household 
level, the researcher could construct income inequality indexes for each school district, 
such as the Gini coefficient, which would provide for the ideal dependent variable. Since 
the decision to move is not made precipitously, a longer time period will allow the 
researcher to measure additional residential movement, which may be caused by a 
reform-induced increase of peer effects in the previously low-spending districts. In other 
words, with data at the micro level over a longer time period, the researcher can 
empirically test how a specific household’s utility function is affected by the exogenous 
shock of school finance reform and the potential resulting feedback effects. Due to data 
availability issues however, I am unable to obtain data of this type. 
The dependent variable throughout all regressions is the percent below poverty 
within each district. Although not ideal, this measurement should proxy for district 
income segregation. As highlighted in the theoretical section, we expect to see a decrease 
in the percent of households below poverty in low-spending and poor district as a result 
of reform. In addition, all previous literature addressing the effect of reform on income 
heterogeneity use the percent of households or families below poverty as their measure 
for income segregation.
24
 The following section first discuses the data I have accessed 
and reviews my collection procedures. I then provide statistics on the dataset, comparing 
                                                 
24
 Aaronson (1999), Downs & Figlio (1999b), and Lamm (2001). 
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Kentucky and Tennessee, and use these statistics to both provide initial analysis and 
identify potential problems that may affect a difference-in-differences estimation. 
Data Sources 
 I derive the demographic and industry variables from the 1990 and 2000 US 
Decennial Censuses.
25
 Specifically, I accessed the School District Demographics System 
(SDDS) provided by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), which allows 
users to download select demographic data at the school district level from the 1990 and 
2000 Censuses. The 1989-90 and 1999-2000 NCES Longitudinal School District Fiscal-
Nonfiscal Files supply the education finance measurements, specifically the total per 
pupil expenditure data. Every data observation is taken at the school district level for both 
Kentucky and Tennessee during the years 1990 and 2000.  
 A number of issues became apparent during the data collection process. First, 
between 1990 and 2000, NCES changed the way it classified some Tennessee school 
districts. In particular, the data for a number of school districts in 2000 are broken down 
into the city or cities within the actual school district.
26
 To address this problem, I take 
the weighted average of the variables across the district and all the sub-districts 
identified, using total population and total households as weights for respective 
population and household variables.
27
 Second, I am unable to incorporate three Kentucky 
                                                 
25
 Downloaded from http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sdds/. 
26
 For instance, Coffee County School District is broken up into “Coffee County School District” and 
“Coffee County School District in Manchester”, even though no Coffee County School District in 
Manchester exists. 
27
 In the Coffee County example, to find the 2000 median household income, I multiplied both median 
household entries of the “Coffee County School District” and “Coffee County School District in 
Manchester” by their respective number of total households and then divided by the sum of the total 
households. 
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school districts due to incomplete data.
28
 Third, because I am unable to access private 
school data at the school district level, I use percent enrolled in private school at the 
county level.
29
 Most districts in Kentucky and Tennessee are entire counties; however, 
for districts within a county, I assign their respective counties’ private school measures. 
Total Districts Statistics 
 Table 1 provides variable definitions, while Tables 2 and 3 detail the summary 
statistics and give a total district comparison for each state in each time period. 
Comparing the means of the Kentucky and Tennessee variables during both time periods 
reveals expected similarities between the two states. Both states are predominately white, 
exhibit mean poverty levels above the national average for both years (US Census 
Bureau), and have a similar rural makeup, along with a comparable mean percentage of 
renter occupied housing. In addition, the age composition and the educational 
background of residents in both states are similar. The tables do highlight some pertinent 
differences between the two states. Most notably, Tennessee not only has fewer school 
districts in both time periods (136 versus 175 Kentucky districts), but those districts also 
have a mean population roughly twice that of Kentucky (a 2000 mean population of 
43,404 versus 22,915). This may affect the residential sorting decisions of households, 
since both a larger population and a fewer number of districts could theoretically 
decrease a household’s incentive to sort by income across districts within a state.30 
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 Those districts are Anchorage Independent School District, Fort Campbell Dependent Schools, and Fort 
Knox Dependent Schools – all of which are missing school finance variables. Coincidentally, Clark (2003) 
excludes Anchorage Independent School District because it is a “tremendous outlier in median income or 
current expenditures per pupil.” 
29
 I access these data directly from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses. 
30
 The larger a district’s population, the more likely it will not be homogeneous (with respect to the 
distribution of income). Similarly, the fewer number of districts within a household’s residential decision, 
the lower the probability is that districts will appeal to specific household desires. In other words, both 
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Applying a difference-in-differences regression approach should address these initial 
differences in sorting. The number and size of districts in a state, however, may affect 
how households respond to the exogenous shock of school finance reform. 
To test the above hypothesis, I ran t-tests on the 1990 mean school district in both 
states, which reveal some differences in income distribution. Specifically, the 1990 mean 
Kentucky district has a significantly higher percentage of households with incomes below 
$15,000. In addition, the 1990 mean Tennessee district has a significantly higher 
percentage of households with incomes between $15,000 and $40,000. Supporting the 
notion that larger districts have greater income heterogeneity, the t-tests show that 
Tennessee districts have somewhat less income stratification within districts. This 
relationship may affect the results across all Kentucky and Tennessee districts, as wealthy 
families are less likely to sort into a district of extreme poverty, thus understating the 
impact of KERA. 
Poor and Low-Spending Districts Statistics – Is Tennessee a good control? 
Tables 4 and 5 isolate the districts in the lowest quartile of the 1990 total per pupil 
expenditure distribution, while tables 6 and 7 detail summary statistics for the poorest 
25% of 1990 districts based on the percent of households below poverty. Unlike the total 
district population findings, the mean population of low-spending Tennessee districts is 
smaller in both years relative to Kentucky (but not significant at the 5% level). 
Consequently, the income stratification in the mean Tennessee district should be roughly 
comparable to Kentucky’s mean district. T-tests reveal this to be true, as the household 
income distribution in the mean Tennessee district is similar to Kentucky’s for the 
                                                                                                                                                 
statistics suggest that residents in Tennessee will have a lower incentive to sort, since the districts across 
Tennessee are more comparable than Kentucky’s districts. 
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majority of the income brackets.
31
 Therefore, when looking solely at the income 
distribution between districts, the low-spending Tennessee districts appear to be a 
suitable control group. 
T-tests suggest poor districts, however, differ across states in regard to median 
income and the income distribution. Specifically, poor Kentucky districts have a 
significantly lower median income and higher percentage of households with income 
below $10,000 (almost 40%). In contrast, poor Tennessee districts have a significantly 
higher number of households with incomes ranging between $15,000 and $39,999.
32
 
These results imply that households living in poor Kentucky districts are more likely to 
be in extreme poverty, whereas households in poor Tennessee districts are more 
moderately distributed across income categories relative to Kentucky. These initial 
dissimilarities may bias difference-in-differences estimates downward, as households are 
less likely to move to an area of extreme poverty. 
Differences between state education finance systems can be seen in the mean total 
expenditure per pupil variable, as Kentucky contributes significantly more to its low-
spending districts relative to Tennessee in both 1990 and 2000. Similar to the poverty and 
unemployment measurement, the difference in mean expenditures potentially introduces 
a problem in the estimation process if a per pupil spending threshold exists, since school 
funding’s diminishing marginal returns implies that school quality cannot be significantly 
improved above a certain funding limit.
33
 If KERA results in increasing funding to 
                                                 
31
 Tennessee’s mean low-spending district has a significantly higher number of households with $15,000 to 
$25,000 in yearly income. All other income brackets are statistically comparable to Kentucky’s mean low-
income district. 
32
 Also, poor Tennessee districts have a higher number of households with income between $45,000 and 
$49,999. 
33
 See Hanushek (1997). 
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Kentucky’s low-spending districts above this threshold, the findings will understate the 
true impact reform similar to KERA has on income sorting. 
While the variations discussed above have the potential to bias difference-in-
differences estimates, there exist a number of similarities between the two states. Among 
other variables, both poor and low-spending districts exhibit comparable education and 
age characteristics across states. Additionally, Tennessee’s education reforms throughout 
the decade reflect the normal trend of finance reform across the country, and Clark 
(2003) convincingly proves these reforms were relatively weak in comparison to KERA. 
It remains important, however, to consider these significant initial differences between 
states when interpreting the empirical results, as the potential for biased estimates exists. 
Initial Analysis – Did KERA pull poor and low-spending districts up? 
For KERA-induced residential resorting to occur in low-spending districts, KERA 
must be progressive in regard to district per pupil expenditure levels. In other words, 
KERA must affect the per pupil expenditure level rankings of districts, pulling initially 
low-spending districts up to a higher spending ranking in 2000 relative to other districts. 
Likewise, for KERA-induced resorting to occur in poor districts, those districts must 
experience a higher increase in per pupil expenditures when compared to other districts. 
Clark (2003) shows that KERA’s effect on per pupil current expenditures in relation to 
district median income is progressive, as districts with lower incomes spent, on average, 
more per pupil than rich districts by 2000. Her analysis, however, only briefly highlights 
the movement in current expenditures of low-spending districts.
34
 
                                                 
34
 Somewhat surprisingly, Clark finds the ratio of per pupil expenditures at the 10
th
 percentile to the median 
decreased from 1990 to 2000, suggesting that KERA may not have pulled low-spending districts up to an 
equalized funding level. Conversely, the ratio of the 25
th
 percentile to the median increased. 
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My investigation of KERA’s progressiveness in relation to low-spending districts 
uncovers mixed results. Statistical tests comparing low-spending Kentucky districts to the 
rest of the state find that the mean and median change in total per pupil expenditure levels 
is statistically insignificant between groups.
35
 These findings suggest that, when 
considering initial district total per pupil expenditure levels, instead of equalizing the 
expenditures of low-spending districts to other Kentucky districts, KERA increased 
expenditures for all districts uniformly. Such a result would generate no incentive for 
households to relocate, as all districts experience roughly the same increase in spending. 
In contrast, charts graphing the expenditure rankings of districts in both Kentucky 
and Tennessee highlight substantial movement in ranking for low-spending Kentucky 
districts post reform (See Charts 1 and 2). In particular, the Kentucky chart reveals that 
approximately 70% of low-spending districts, and roughly 59% of districts initially below 
the median expenditure level moved to a higher spending quartile by 2000.
36
 Contrary to 
the t-test results, these findings suggest that KERA did, in fact, generate some substantial 
changes in spending levels which may motivate households to relocate.
37
 
Since I primarily classify poor districts via the percent of households in poverty 
distribution and not median income, I additionally need to address KERA’s progressivity 
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 This result holds when mild and severe outliers are excluded. Mild outliers are defined as districts with 
per pupil expenditure changes that are either: a.) less than or equal to the 25
th
 percentile of the change in per 
pupil expenditure – 1.5*(inter quartile range) of their grouped districts, or b.) greater than or equal to the 
75
th
 percentile of the change in per pupil expenditure + 1.5*(inter quartile range) of their grouped districts. 
Similarly, severe outliers are defined by the same expression, except the inter quartile range in multiplied 
by three. Statistical tests refer to the t-test for the equality of the means and a K-sample test for the equality 
of the medians. 
36
 The 59% calculation includes poor districts that remained in the highest spending quartile from 1990 to 
2000. 
37
 When compared to Tennessee findings, however, the Kentucky numbers are not significantly different, 
which suggests that, with respect to the expenditure changes of initially low-spending districts, KERA’s 
finance reform is not extremely different from the reforms undergone in Tennessee throughout the decade. 
If Tennessee’s reform history regarding expenditure changes of initially low-spending districts is in fact not 
representative of the nation’s, KERA’s effect on income integration may be biased downwards. 
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with regard to the household poverty rate. A t-test on the equality of the means reveals 
that, when outliers are excluded, the mean change in total expenditures per pupil in poor 
districts is not significantly different from the mean change in all other Kentucky 
districts. The poor district median change, however, is significantly larger at the 10% 
level when outliers are excluded. At best, these statistical comparisons imply that KERA 
marginally improved poor districts’ expenditures relative to the rest of the state. 
Charts 3-6 reveal that while KERA may have only marginally improved the total 
expenditure level over time, poor districts were already spending equally per pupil, if not 
more, than the other Kentucky districts. When compared to Tennessee’s initial 
distribution (Chart 5), which displays a wide distribution around the trend line and 
negative relationship between the poverty rate and total per pupil expenditures, it is clear 
that 1990 Kentucky districts were more equally funded across poverty rate. This is a 
surprising result that differs from Clark (2003), who finds Kentucky’s 1990 finance 
system to be regressive when considering current expenditures per pupil and median 
income. Specifically, Chart 3 implies that Kentucky already funded poor districts equally 
– in other words, Kentucky poor districts did not need to be pulled up. Chart 4, 
nevertheless, suggests poor districts continued to receive increased funding over time, 
which is supported by the numbers, as roughly 59% of poor districts moved to a higher 
spending quartile (or remained in the highest one) in 2000. Additionally, the slope of the 
trend line in Chart 4 (post-KERA) is significantly steeper than Chart 3 trend line’s slope 
(pre-KERA), which suggests that KERA significantly increased the progressivity of 
Kentucky’s school finance system. Although the 1990 Kentucky results differ from Clark 
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(2003), the numbers, along with the comparison of slopes do reflect some progressivity in 
total expenditures per pupil when considering household poverty rate.
38
 
The mixed results suggest KERA may or may not generate enough incentives 
relative to Tennessee for households living in higher spending districts to move to 
previously low-spending or poor districts. That said, there is evidence that the majority of 
poor and low-spending Kentucky districts were pulled up in funding by 2000. While 
Clark (2003) convincingly illuminates the progressivity of KERA in relation to current 
expenditures and low-income districts, it is not fully clear that KERA’s extreme 
progressivity holds when considering total per pupil expenditures across either initially 
low-spending districts or poor districts classified by household poverty rate. Thus, to 
address this discrepancy, my robustness checks include districts classified by their 
median household income and median housing unit value. 
Initial Analysis – Changes in low-spending and poor districts 
A comparison of means reveals that the change in the percent of households 
below poverty declines in both states’ low-spending districts between 1990 and 2000, 
with Kentucky and Tennessee experiencing a roughly 3.5% and 2.5% drop respectively. 
Correspondingly, the means calculated for poor districts in each state are negative, as the 
household poverty rate in Kentucky falls by roughly 5.7%, while the Tennessee poverty 
rate decreases by approximately 4.8%. The differences in both the low-spending and poor 
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 One possible explanation is the difference in school finance variables analyzed. Current expenditures 
provide insight into the daily operations of districts, while total expenditures include among others, capital 
outlays and expenditures on programs outside of normal public education. If I had more time to continue 
this research, I would primarily use current expenditures, as this measurement provides better insight into 
money spent purely on public education and can more aptly be used to compare finances across states (St. 
John et al., 2007). It is important to mention, however, my failure to use current per pupil expenditures in 
this comparison will not affect my overall results, as per pupil expenditure is not included in my 
regressions. 
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district means, however, are statistically insignificant across states, which suggests 
initially that KERA did not alter income stratification across districts. 
Analysis 
 To estimate KERA’s impact on Kentucky’s residential sorting patterns across 
districts, I implement a difference-in-differences analysis and use the percent of 
households below poverty (perbelowpov) as the primary dependent variable in my 
empirical model, since it is both indexed to inflation and a measure of income within the 
districts. In particular, along with the control variables, I regress the dependent variable 
on an interaction term equal to the multiplication of a Kentucky dummy variable and a 
Pre/Post KERA dummy variable.
39
 This interaction term, labeled “interact”, will carry in 
its coefficient the impact of KERA on income segregation across Kentucky districts. My 
empirical model mirrors Clark (2003), which similarly implements an interaction variable 
to calculate KERA’s effect on ACT scores. 
My primary analysis focuses on low-spending and poor districts, specifically 
districts in the lowest quartile of 1990 total per pupil expenditures and districts in the 
highest quartile of the 1990 household poverty rate distribution. While the theory 
outlined above assumes a completely localized school funding scheme in which poor 
districts and low-spending districts are synonymous, in the real world, low-spending 
districts are not always the poorest districts. Downes and Figlio (1999a) argue the 
greatest amount of reform-induced residential movement should be observed in low-
spending districts – not poor districts. The authors explicitly highlight this weakness in 
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 The Kentucky dummy variable equals one when a school district is located in Kentucky and zero when a 
school district is located in Tennessee. The Pre/Post KERA dummy variable equals one for 2000 school 
districts and zero for 1990 school districts. The interaction term resulting from the multiplication of these 
two dummy variables, equals one for all 2000 Kentucky school districts and zero for all other districts. 
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Aaronson’s (1999) analysis, which focuses on heterogeneity changes in poor districts, 
and suggest that research should concentrate on residential movement in low-spending 
districts. Previous research on KERA, however, identifies KERA’s significant role in 
equalizing school funding across districts, especially in regard to property wealth and 
income.
40
 Thus, while I primarily focus on both poor and low-spending districts, for the 
purpose of robustness, I also consider both district median household income and district 
median housing unit value in my analysis. 
Expected Signs 
 District demographic variables significantly affect residential decisions. 
Specifically, I include in my primary analysis percent rural population, percent renter-
occupied housing, unemployment rate, median household income, age, education level, 
and race. Since significant portions of both Kentucky and Tennessee are located in the 
rural and poor Appalachian Region, I expect the percent of rural population within a 
district to be associated with an increase in poverty.
41
 In addition, since renting signifies a 
lack of wealth or income, I predict the percent of renter-occupied housing to be similarly 
related to increased poverty. Age and education level are anticipated to negatively impact 
percent below poverty, as wealth typically increases with both. Race carries an 
ambiguous predicted effect, since racial discrimination in the housing and labor markets 
may cause the race variables to affect the dependent variable positively. If an 
insignificant amount of racial discrimination exists, however, race should not affect the 
percent below poverty, as both income and education are controlled for. 
                                                 
40
 Adams & White (1997), Clark (2003), Hoyt (1999). 
41
 See CensusMapper (2006). 
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 In addition to demographic variables, the empirical framework includes a 
measurement for private school attendance. Specifically, the percent enrolled in private 
school carries an uncertain sign since incentives exist for private schools to locate in both 
rich and in poor districts. For the purpose of controlling for any macroeconomic shifts, 
thirteen industry dummies are added in later phase of the model. In particular, the 
dummies equal one, if the district percentage of laborers within one industry is greater 
than the state mean that year, and zero otherwise. 
Regression Analysis 
 The difference-in-differences approach will calculate the average change in the 
percent below poverty in Kentucky and subtract the average change in the percent below 
poverty in Tennessee. The subsequent result represents KERA’s effect on the percent 
below poverty, holding all else constant. My primary analysis implements two phases of 
this model, where the 2
nd
 Phase incorporates industry dummies. I additionally run 
regressions for the 2
nd
 Phase using ten different groups of districts as robustness checks.
42
 
The generalized form of the 2
nd
 Phase can be seen below: 
dtdtdtdtdtdtdt ZXeractntpostkyvperbelowpo   543210 i  (6) 
where dtvperbelowpo  represents the percent below poverty within district d in the year t, 
dtky  is a dummy variable equal to one if a school district is located in Kentucky and zero 
if the district is located in Tennessee, dtpost  is a dummy variable equal to one for 2000 
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 In order, the robustness groups are: (1) Poor Districts defined by median household income (the poorest 
quartile of districts in 1990); (2) Poor Districts defined by median household value (the poorest quartile of 
districts in 1990); (3) 10
th
 Percentile Low-Spending Districts; (4) 2
nd
 Spending Quartile (districts in the 2
nd
 
quartile of total per pupil expenditure); (5) 3
rd
 Spending Quartile (districts in the 3
rd
 quartile of total per 
pupil expenditure); (6) Highest Spending Quartile (districts in the 4tt quartile of total per pupil 
expenditure); (7) 10
th
 Percentile Poor Districts; (8) 2
nd
 Poorest Quartile (districts in the 3
rd
 quartile of 
household poverty rate); (9) 2
nd
 Richest Quartile (districts in the 2
nd
 quartile of household poverty rate); and 
(10) Richest Districts (districts in the 1
st
 quartile of household poverty rate). 
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school districts and zero for 1990 school districts, dt  is the stochastic error term, while 
dtX  and dtZ  equal vectors of demographic/school controls and industry dummies 
respectively. The variable of interest, dteractnti , is generated by multiplying the dtky  and 
dtpost  dummies, and equals one for all 2000 Kentucky school districts and zero for all 
other districts. 
 I assume serial correlation is insignificant in my empirical approach, since the 
data are from only two time periods. Additionally, the low number of observation years 
makes any correct for serial correlation quite difficult. Heteroskedasticity, alternatively, 
is expected and confirmed to be present in both phases, as the Park Test identifies 
evidence of heteroskedastic residual patterns for all analyzed groups.
43
 To control for 
heteroskedasticity, I use the “robust” function in STATA, which creates estimates 
containing heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors.
44
 
 In addition to heteroskedasticity, the empirical model is plagued with 
multicollinearity, as many of the demographic/school controls and the industry controls 
are significantly correlated.
45
 It remains difficult to correct for this, because the majority 
of correlations make sense and, moreover, the controls theoretically belong in the model. 
The impact of multicollinearity – specifically, increased R-squared values and standard 
errors – may partially explain my results, which I detail below. 
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 Specifically, the Park Test finds the coefficients of the log of median household income (low-spending 
and all districts), percent rural (poor districts), the log of total per pupil expenditure (2
nd
 spending quartile), 
and the percent with a 12
th
 grade education or less (3
rd
 spending quartile) all significant when regressed as a 
double-log regression of the squared residual. 
44
 Explicitly, the “robust” function predicts the variance based on a covariance matrix and a list of 
equations regarding each variable (STATA Manual). 
45
 In particular, both percent rural and percent renter-occupied housing, and percent 12
th
 grade or less 
education and the log of median household income are severely negatively correlated (-.76). Further, the 
unemployment rate is negatively correlated with the log of median household income (-.74) and positively 
correlated with the percent 12
th
 grade or less education (-.63). 
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Results 
 Supporting the difference in means comparison discussed in the Summary 
Statistics section, the interaction coefficient in both phases of my primary results is 
statistically insignificant, while the predicted magnitude is roughly zero.
46
 The reader 
should refer to Table A below for selected primary results and Tables 8-12 for complete 
regression results. The Phase 1 Low-Spending regression estimates that KERA had 
exactly zero effect on the household poverty rate in low-spending districts, while the 
Phase 2 Poor regression estimates that KERA increased the percent of households below 
poverty by 0.1%. Both coefficients are insignificant, as their respective t-statistics are 
extremely low (-0.01 and -0.11). Additionally, 95% confidence intervals across all 
primary regressions suggest that at most, KERA either decreased the poverty rate by 
1.5% or increased the poverty rate by 1.8% (See Table 9). Further, regressions classifying 
poor districts by both 1990 median household income and 1990 median household value, 
predict KERA to have an insignificant effect of less than 1% (See Table 10). 
The statistical insignificance and the small magnitude of the interaction 
coefficient hold across virtually every robustness check, lending support to the 
conclusion that KERA did not affect residential income segregation across districts.
47
 
Furthermore, since the interaction coefficient demonstrates consistent magnitude and 
insignificance across the majority of robustness checks, the results do not disprove the 
hypotheses discussed in the Summary Statistics section regarding an underestimation of 
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 “Statistically significant” coefficients refer to the 5% significance level. 
47
 In fact, the only significant estimate of the interaction term occurs in the 2
nd
 Richest Quartile regression. 
Specifically, KERA is estimated to decrease poverty in the 2
nd
 quartile of household poverty rate 
distribution by approximately 1%. This result is somewhat unexpected theoretically, but might be explained 
by the interaction coefficient in the 10
th
 Percentile Poor regression. In particular, KERA is estimated to 
increase the poverty rate of the poorest 10% of districts (although the coefficient is insignificant). It is 
possible that the relatively few poor households in the 2
nd
 Richest Quartile moved as a result of KERA to 
the 10
th
 Percentile Poor districts, increasing the poverty rate of the previously poorest 10% of districts. 
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KERA in low-spending and poor districts. In fact, the largest absolute magnitude for the 
interaction coefficient over all primary regressions is -.003, found in the Phase 2 Low-
Spending regression, suggesting that KERA reduced the percent below poverty in low-
spending Kentucky districts by 0.3%. 
 Median income and unemployment rate, along with percent renter occupied 
housing, percent with education at or below the 12
th
 grade level, and percent 65 and older 
maintain statistically significant coefficients and exhibit predicted signs in both phases of 
all primary regressions. Unemployment rate is expected to increase the percent below 
poverty in low-spending districts the greatest, as both phases estimate a 10% increase to 
result in a roughly 4% growth of the percent below poverty. In contrast, the percent 
enrolled in private schools is predicted to have approximately zero effect on the 
household poverty rate in both low-spending and poor districts, however, all coefficients 
are statistically insignificant. The percent black coefficient is positive and significant in 
both Phase 1 and Phase 2 Poor regressions, which tenuously suggests that racial 
discrimination may exist in the housing and/or labor markets of poor Kentucky districts. 
Further, while the percent rural coefficient exhibits its expected sign, its significant holds 
only in the Phase 1 Low-Spending regression. 
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Table A: Primary Results 
 
Classification Low-Spending Districts Poor Districts Low-Spending Districts Poor Districts 
 Phase 1 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 2 
 
Ky 0.018 0.011 0.019 0.017 
 (3.31)** -1.47 (3.27)** (2.48)* 
Post 0.021 0.012 0.026 0.009 
 (2.94)** -1.55 (3.29)** -1.11 
interact 0 0.003 -0.003 0.001 
 -0.01 -0.36 -0.53 -0.11 
lnmedhhinc -0.228 -0.279 -0.224 -0.273 
 (10.74)** (13.82)** (10.53)** (12.92)** 
perblack 0.011 0.05 0.001 0.046 
 -0.48 (2.48)* -0.05 (2.12)* 
pernotwhbl -0.108 -0.49 -0.048 -0.373 
 -0.94 -1.57 -0.43 -1.21 
perrural 0.025 0.008 0.015 0.011 
 (3.04)** -0.8 -1.79 -1.06 
perrentocc 0.193 0.134 0.16 0.126 
 (5.45)** (3.40)** (4.37)** (3.13)** 
per12thorless 0.106 0.154 0.11 0.126 
 (2.37)* (3.27)** (2.27)* (2.53)* 
per2064 -0.094 -0.33 -0.205 -0.311 
 -0.79 (2.37)* -1.46 (2.14)* 
per65up -0.341 -0.582 -0.39 -0.525 
 (3.47)** (6.62)** (3.78)** (6.62)** 
perprivenroll 0 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 -1.07 -1.75 -1.51 -0.75 
unemprate 0.372 0.188 0.409 0.196 
 (4.14)** (3.03)** (4.36)** (2.97)** 
Constant 2.473 3.193 2.499 3.11 
 (10.00)** (13.39)** (10.54)** (13.12)** 
Observations 156 156 156 156 
R-squared 0.94 0.93 0.95 0.94 
 
Dependent Variable: perbelowpov; Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
In general, the results suggest multicollinearity and possible omitted variable bias 
as they reveal inflated R-squared values across regressions, low test statistics, and at 
times, some dramatic changes in control variable coefficient magnitudes. For example, 
the unemployment rate coefficient varies between .049 and .377 and is insignificant in 
half of the low-spending and poverty robustness checks (Table 11 and 12). Although 
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insignificant, the percent between ages 20 and 64 coefficient doubles between Phase 1 
and Phase 2 Low-Spending primary regressions. Additionally, the average R-squared 
value in both Phase 1 regressions, which include the least controls of any regression used, 
is 0.935. 
Discussion 
The primary analysis suggests that KERA has no impact on changes in residential 
income segregation across Kentucky low-spending or poor school districts over the 1990-
2000 time period. The insignificance of the interaction coefficient may be attributed to 
multicollinearity, which is reflected in the high R-squared value in the primary 
regressions.
48
 While multicollinearity may somewhat explain the insignificance of the 
interaction variable, it is also rare to have a statistically significant zero coefficient. With 
this in mind, in order to convincingly prove an insignificant zero coefficient “significant”, 
one of two relationships must be shown: either the interaction coefficient is zero and 
insignificant across all subgroups, or the coefficient is significant and offsetting across all 
subgroups.
49
 I, however, do not have the data to prove either since the percent below 
poverty is the only inflation-indexed income measurement I have at the school district 
level. 
I am able to compare the effect of KERA across different groups within 
Kentucky, specifically the ones who are theoretically predicted to experience an increase 
in the percent below poverty, as wealthier households move out in favor of living in 
previously low-spending or poor districts. Specifically, the low-spending and poor 
robustness groups, detailed in Tables 11 and 12, aim to measure this interaction. The 
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 In fact, the lowest R-squared value across all regressions in Phase 2 and Phase 3 is .93. 
49
 The subgroups refer to the percent of households in each indexed income bracket within each low-
spending or poor district. 
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results indicate KERA has virtually no impact on the change in percent below poverty in 
these districts.
50
 In addition, the interaction coefficient is roughly zero and insignificant 
across the other two robustness groups, namely poor districts classified by both median 
household income and median household value (Table 10). 
Admittedly, this “poor-man’s” approach does not take into consideration the 
potential difference in the in- and out-migration across districts, which could significantly 
affect the dependent variable within each regression. In possible further exploration 
however, I may be able to obtain inflation-indexed income brackets at the census tract or 
block group level and aggregate them into school district-level measurements via 
Geographic Information Systems.
51
 Such an approach would negate the potential 
differential impact of the in- and out-migration across groups, enabling me to test 
whether one of the two aforementioned relationships exist solely within low-spending or 
poor districts. 
In addition, there is evidence of possible omitted variable bias, as a number of 
variable coefficients fluctuate in magnitude and significance across robustness checks. In 
the future, I may address this by including a crime variable, a measurement for school 
peer effects, and possibly a measurement identifying differential effects of KERA.
52
 My 
classification of low-spending groups may also be improved through the use of current 
district expenditures, as it provides a better measurement of public school spending 
                                                 
50
 See Footnote 45. 
51
 Technically, I would overlay two shapefiles, one with the block group or census tract indexed data and 
boundaries and the other with the school district boundaries. Next, I would spatially join the block group or 
census tract indexed data to each school district, aggregating the indexed data to the school district-level. 
52
 Presently, my analysis assumes KERA affected all districts in Kentucky equally. It remains likely, 
however, that districts responded to KERA differently. In fact, because of monetary incentives in the 
school funding structure, districts have been found to alter the number of students identified as learning 
disabled (Cullen, 2003). As of now, however, I am unable to identify a variable that identifies differences 
across Kentucky districts as to how KERA was received. 
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across districts and states when compared to total expenditures. Furthermore, my analysis 
is limited with respect to the scope of time. Residential decisions carry large fixed costs, 
and thus are not easy decisions for households. In addition, households may not 
internalize the increased school funding in other districts until consistent equalization is 
shown. 
Conclusion 
 The literature analyzing KERA’s effects finds consistent evidence that KERA 
dramatically changed the funding structure for Kentucky school districts. Indeed, I find 
similar evidence, as roughly 70% of low-spending districts and approximately 59% of 
poor districts moved to a higher quartile by 2000 (see Chart 1 and Chart 4).
53
 Such a 
funding change carries with it potential influences outside of the realm of education. The 
few studies that have analyzed the relationship between school finance and residential 
income heterogeneity focus on reform across the nation, finding weak and insignificant 
results (Aaronson, 1999; Downs & Figlio, 1999b; Lamm, 2001). Generalizing reform for 
the purpose of national studies may contribute to such fragile findings, and until either 
significant national findings or a number of state-specific finance reform analyses are 
completed, the question remains: does school finance reform reduce residential income 
segregation? 
The results found in this state-specific analysis suggest that reform does not affect 
income segregation across districts. Across all estimations, KERA – one of the largest 
attacks on a state school system
54
 – is found to be an insignificant predictor of district 
changes in the household percent below poverty. Granted, one cannot apply what has 
                                                 
53
 The poor district calculation includes poor districts in the highest 1990 spending quartile remaining there 
in 2000. 
54
 See Adams & White (1997). 
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happened in one state to the nation, however, this state-specific analysis contributes to 
both the sparse literature evaluating reform’s effect on income heterogeneity, as well as 
to the understanding of school finance reform as a whole. 
There are, nevertheless, significant flaws in my analysis, as the data suffer from 
multicollinearity and possible omitted variable bias. To the extent that I may be unable to 
correct these issues, it remains feasible to include inflation-indexed income brackets, 
which would enable me to run regressions on certain income subgroups within low-
spending and poor districts. A more definitive answer to whether KERA affected income 
segregation across Kentucky districts would necessarily depend on such results. 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions 
(Demographic, School, and Industry Variables) 
Variable Definition 
ky Dummy variable equal to 1 if district is located in Kentucky 
post Dummy variable equal to 1 if observation is in the year 2000 
interact The independent variable of interest: interaction variable equal to (ky x post) 
perbelowpov The dependent variable: percent of people below the poverty line 
totalpop Total district population 
medhhincome Median household income 
perblack Percent of people who are Black 
pernotwhbl Percent of people who are not Black or White 
perrural Percent of households who live in a rural area 
perrentocc Percent renter occupied housing 
per12thorless Percent of people with a 12th grade or less education (did not complete high school)* 
per2064 Percent of people age 20-64 
per65up Percent of people 65 and older 
puptotexp Total expenditures per pupil 
perprivenroll Percent of people age 3 and up attending a private school 
unemprate Unemployment rate 
perag1 Percent of labor force in agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting & mining 
pertrans1 Percent of labor force in transportation, warehousing & utilities 
perconstruct1 Percent of labor force in construction 
permanufac1 Percent of labor force in manufacturing 
perinfo1 Percent of labor force in information 
perfin1 Percent of labor force finance, insurance, real estate, & rental & leasing 
perprofess1 
 
Percent of labor force in professional, scientific, technical services, 
management of companies & enterprises, & administrative, support & waste management services 
peredhealth1 Percent of labor force in health care, social & educational services 
perartsfood1 Percent of labor force in arts, entertainment, recreation, accomodation & food services 
perotherserve1 Percent of labor force in other services (except public administration) 
perpublicadmin1 Percent of labor force in public administration 
perwholesale1 Percent of labor force in wholesale trade 
perretail1 Percent of labor force in retail trade 
 
All data are from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses with the exception of school finance data, which is from the NCES Longitudinal School 
District Fiscal-Nonfiscal File, Fiscal Years 1990 and 2000 
*The educational attainment measurements for 1990 are for all persons 20 and up, while the measurements in 2000 are for all persons 18 and up. 
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Table 2: Kentucky Summary Statistics 
1990 Demographic, School, and Industry Variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
perbelowpov 175 0.2281 0.0974 0.0145 0.5525 
totalpop 175 20896 53165 1122 662720 
medhhincome 175 26740 8000 10950 52738 
perblack 175 0.0402 0.0515 0.0000 0.2337 
pernotwhbl 175 0.0050 0.0054 0.0000 0.0411 
perrural 175 0.6337 0.3995 0.0000 1.0000 
perrentocc 175 0.2807 0.0992 0.1439 0.6306 
per12thorless 175 0.3994 0.1056 0.1277 0.6261 
per2064 175 0.5659 0.0240 0.4801 0.6423 
per65up 175 0.1425 0.0348 0.0633 0.2579 
puptotexp 175 4197 507 3207 7458 
perprivenroll 175 5.0263 5.9098 0.0000 22.6000 
unemprate 175 0.0968 0.0457 0.0249 0.2548 
perag1 175 0.0751 0.0664 0.0011 0.3559 
pertrans1 175 0.0534 0.0208 0.0159 0.1535 
perconstruct1 175 0.0673 0.0230 0.0115 0.1875 
permanufac1 175 0.2020 0.0873 0.0205 0.4174 
perinfo1 175 0.0294 0.0082 0.0060 0.0518 
perfin1 175 0.0409 0.0161 0.0030 0.0973 
perprofess1 175 0.0648 0.0119 0.0298 0.0934 
peredhealth1 175 0.1709 0.0533 0.0973 0.4503 
perartsfood1 175 0.0678 0.0141 0.0379 0.1100 
perotherserve1 175 0.0340 0.0072 0.0144 0.0578 
perpublicadmin1 175 0.0456 0.0352 0.0126 0.3351 
perwholesale1 175 0.0327 0.0152 0.0002 0.1026 
perretail1 175 0.1161 0.0269 0.0646 0.2105 
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Table 2 (con.): Kentucky Summary Statistics 
2000 Demographic, School, and Industry Variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
perbelowpov 175 0.1907 0.0869 0.0296 0.4538 
totalpop 175 22915 56332 1125 691270 
medhhincome 175 30092 8812 15034 63321 
perblack 175 0.0406 0.0537 0.0000 0.3016 
pernotwhbl 175 0.0194 0.0118 0.0028 0.0648 
perrural 175 0.5950 0.3913 0.0000 1.0000 
perrentocc 175 0.2727 0.1037 0.1326 0.5939 
per12thorless 175 0.3087 0.0925 0.0810 0.4980 
per2064 175 0.5895 0.0239 0.5020 0.6625 
per65up 175 0.1384 0.0317 0.0695 0.2459 
puptotexp 175 6932 1005 5223 12971 
perprivenroll 175 7.9571 6.2185 0.5000 26.1000 
unemprate 175 0.0676 0.0299 0.0144 0.1765 
perag1 175 0.0486 0.0400 0.0000 0.1948 
pertrans1 175 0.0574 0.0206 0.0189 0.1272 
perconstruct1 175 0.0772 0.0221 0.0202 0.1643 
permanufac1 175 0.1946 0.0803 0.0193 0.3987 
perinfo1 175 0.0186 0.0097 0.0000 0.0674 
perfin1 175 0.0424 0.0176 0.0168 0.1032 
perprofess1 175 0.0484 0.0202 0.0136 0.1220 
peredhealth1 175 0.2055 0.0560 0.1158 0.4207 
perartsfood1 175 0.0638 0.0220 0.0256 0.1402 
perotherserve1 175 0.0460 0.0097 0.0193 0.0741 
perpublicadmin1 175 0.0461 0.0303 0.0074 0.2814 
perwholesale1 175 0.0286 0.0116 0.0073 0.0662 
perretail1 175 0.1222 0.0236 0.0798 0.2048 
 
All data are from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses with the exception of school finance data, which is from the 
NCES Longitudinal School District Fiscal-Nonfiscal File, Fiscal Years 1990 and 2000  
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Table 3: Tennessee Summary Statistics 
1990 Demographic, School, and Industry Variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
perbelowpov 136 0.1780 0.0573 0.0515 0.4005 
totalpop 136 34669 74951 1154 610337 
medhhincome 136 29339 6798 15883 64592 
perblack 136 0.0833 0.1084 0.0000 0.5488 
pernotwhbl 136 0.0064 0.0054 0.0000 0.0316 
perrural 136 0.5939 0.3990 0.0000 1.0000 
perrentocc 136 0.2668 0.0936 0.1078 0.5243 
per12thorless 136 0.3954 0.0860 0.1087 0.5557 
per2064 136 0.5725 0.0266 0.4778 0.6235 
per65up 136 0.1507 0.0363 0.0542 0.2496 
puptotexp 136 4183 914 2869 8733 
perprivenroll 136 3.3625 3.1496 0.2000 16.8000 
unemprate 136 0.0767 0.0252 0.0275 0.2015 
perag1 136 0.0323 0.0205 0.0020 0.0981 
pertrans1 136 0.0458 0.0133 0.0226 0.1086 
perconstruct1 136 0.0673 0.0184 0.0232 0.1110 
permanufac1 136 0.3061 0.0832 0.1201 0.4796 
perinfo1 136 0.0358 0.0090 0.0212 0.0725 
perfin1 136 0.0386 0.0152 0.0155 0.0987 
perprofess1 136 0.0547 0.0137 0.0226 0.1300 
peredhealth1 136 0.1482 0.0354 0.0666 0.2433 
perartsfood1 136 0.0624 0.0144 0.0345 0.1283 
perotherserve1 136 0.0303 0.0088 0.0151 0.0643 
perpublicadmin1 136 0.0403 0.0196 0.0086 0.1320 
perwholesale1 136 0.0308 0.0130 0.0017 0.0744 
perretail1 136 0.1073 0.0216 0.0525 0.1706 
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Table 3 (con.): Tennessee Summary Statistics 
2000 Demographic, School, and Industry Variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
perbelowpov 136 0.1527 0.0452 0.0422 0.2941 
totalpop 136 43404 86247 2205 649845 
medhhincome 136 32351 7655 18938 75877 
perblack 136 0.0852 0.1118 0.0000 0.6120 
pernotwhbl 136 0.0255 0.0163 0.0032 0.1406 
perrural 136 0.5692 0.3645 0.0000 1.0000 
perrentocc 136 0.2685 0.0907 0.1232 0.4968 
per12thorless 136 0.2996 0.0695 0.0961 0.4429 
per2064 136 0.5890 0.0268 0.5048 0.6619 
per65up 136 0.1478 0.0358 0.0743 0.2763 
puptotexp 136 6143 1496 4521 13786 
perprivenroll 136 5.9132 3.8657 0.0000 25.9000 
unemprate 136 0.0594 0.0193 0.0262 0.1490 
perag1 136 0.0241 0.0170 0.0000 0.0777 
pertrans1 136 0.0542 0.0166 0.0226 0.1284 
perconstruct1 136 0.0800 0.0235 0.0266 0.1467 
permanufac1 136 0.2656 0.0781 0.0822 0.4613 
perinfo1 136 0.0163 0.0092 0.0000 0.0557 
perfin1 136 0.0422 0.0168 0.0079 0.1132 
perprofess1 136 0.0523 0.0297 0.0132 0.2583 
peredhealth1 136 0.1719 0.0312 0.1165 0.2577 
perartsfood1 136 0.0638 0.0269 0.0260 0.2223 
perotherserve1 136 0.0448 0.0103 0.0148 0.0860 
perpublicadmin1 136 0.0394 0.0159 0.0128 0.1360 
perwholesale1 136 0.0307 0.0113 0.0102 0.0589 
perretail1 136 0.1146 0.0184 0.0755 0.1657 
 
All data are from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses with the exception of school finance data, which is from the 
NCES Longitudinal School District Fiscal-Nonfiscal File, Fiscal Years 1990 and 2000 
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Table 4: Kentucky Low-Spending* Summary Statistics 
1990 Demographic, School, and Industry Variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
perbelowpov 44 0.2309 0.0858 0.0929 0.3994 
totalpop 44 21119 17733 1122 78294 
medhhincome 44 26277 6356 16210 39576 
perblack 44 0.0250 0.0356 0.0000 0.1783 
pernotwhbl 44 0.0044 0.0061 0.0000 0.0411 
perrural 44 0.7469 0.3232 0.0000 1.0000 
perrentocc 44 0.2444 0.0799 0.1439 0.5086 
per12thorless 44 0.4207 0.0952 0.2121 0.5832 
per2064 44 0.5688 0.0193 0.5277 0.6068 
per65up 44 0.1267 0.0298 0.0633 0.2171 
puptotexp 44 3711 138 3207 3863 
perprivenroll 44 3.5455 3.7682 0.0000 22.6000 
unemprate 44 0.1041 0.0449 0.0410 0.2319 
perag1 44 0.0853 0.0788 0.0110 0.3559 
pertrans1 44 0.0572 0.0175 0.0330 0.1109 
perconstruct1 44 0.0702 0.0254 0.0115 0.1287 
permanufac1 44 0.1964 0.0902 0.0248 0.3250 
perinfo1 44 0.0276 0.0075 0.0134 0.0504 
perfin1 44 0.0382 0.0130 0.0191 0.0823 
perprofess1 44 0.0640 0.0115 0.0402 0.0898 
peredhealth1 44 0.1655 0.0463 0.1023 0.3842 
perartsfood1 44 0.0679 0.0132 0.0379 0.1100 
perotherserve1 44 0.0339 0.0063 0.0144 0.0457 
perpublicadmin1 44 0.0409 0.0202 0.0184 0.1155 
perwholesale1 44 0.0335 0.0139 0.0140 0.0704 
perretail1 44 0.1193 0.0267 0.0660 0.2105  
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Table 4 (con.): Kentucky Low-Spending* Summary Statistics 
2000 Demographic, School, and Industry Variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
perbelowpov 44 0.1959 0.0847 0.0746 0.4056 
totalpop 44 23614 19315 1275 73705 
medhhincome 44 29537 7953 15667 45093 
perblack 44 0.0238 0.0336 0.0000 0.1768 
pernotwhbl 44 0.0179 0.0117 0.0052 0.0573 
perrural 44 0.6924 0.3107 0.0000 1.0000 
perrentocc 44 0.2360 0.0825 0.1400 0.4949 
per12thorless 44 0.3232 0.0888 0.1717 0.4868 
per2064 44 0.5951 0.0206 0.5327 0.6353 
per65up 44 0.1213 0.0213 0.0724 0.1562 
puptotexp 44 6591 605 5442 8330 
perprivenroll 44 5.8818 4.5932 0.5000 26.1000 
unemprate 44 0.0640 0.0275 0.0288 0.1278 
perag1 44 0.0526 0.0451 0.0000 0.1948 
pertrans1 44 0.0612 0.0200 0.0252 0.1182 
perconstruct1 44 0.0813 0.0210 0.0202 0.1303 
permanufac1 44 0.1950 0.0845 0.0193 0.3281 
perinfo1 44 0.0192 0.0082 0.0031 0.0359 
perfin1 44 0.0397 0.0127 0.0192 0.0688 
perprofess1 44 0.0455 0.0145 0.0183 0.1033 
peredhealth1 44 0.1988 0.0525 0.1255 0.4207 
perartsfood1 44 0.0604 0.0174 0.0294 0.1259 
perotherserve1 44 0.0456 0.0089 0.0271 0.0666 
perpublicadmin1 44 0.0421 0.0170 0.0155 0.1038 
perwholesale1 44 0.0316 0.0124 0.0078 0.0662 
perretail1 44 0.1257 0.0232 0.0841 0.1908 
 
All data are from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses with the exception of school finance data, which is from the 
NCES Longitudinal School District Fiscal-Nonfiscal File, Fiscal Years 1990 and 2000 
*Low spending districts are those in the lowest quartile of districts ranked by 1990 total expenditure per pupil  
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Table 5: Tennessee Low-Spending* Summary Statistics 
1990 Demographic, School, and Industry Variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
perbelowpov 34 0.1879 0.0442 0.1083 0.2868 
totalpop 34 14928 11201 1154 51373 
medhhincome 34 26914 3707 20742 41352 
perblack 34 0.1019 0.1277 0.0000 0.4951 
pernotwhbl 34 0.0045 0.0031 0.0000 0.0147 
perrural 34 0.6851 0.3694 0.0000 1.0000 
perrentocc 34 0.2556 0.0797 0.1161 0.4401 
per12thorless 34 0.4362 0.0507 0.3295 0.5230 
per2064 34 0.5611 0.0287 0.4778 0.6093 
per65up 34 0.1582 0.0345 0.0840 0.2465 
puptotexp 34 3386 200 2869 3615 
perprivenroll 34 2.2588 1.4896 0.2000 6.7000 
unemprate 34 0.0798 0.0236 0.0455 0.1505 
perag1 34 0.0363 0.0209 0.0020 0.0833 
pertrans1 34 0.0453 0.0107 0.0267 0.0721 
perconstruct1 34 0.0681 0.0216 0.0232 0.1012 
permanufac1 34 0.3422 0.0621 0.1960 0.4796 
perinfo1 34 0.0348 0.0088 0.0230 0.0645 
perfin1 34 0.0330 0.0098 0.0155 0.0645 
perprofess1 34 0.0499 0.0114 0.0226 0.0724 
peredhealth1 34 0.1437 0.0358 0.0909 0.2360 
perartsfood1 34 0.0561 0.0106 0.0345 0.0827 
perotherserve1 34 0.0263 0.0062 0.0151 0.0430 
perpublicadmin1 34 0.0369 0.0180 0.0086 0.1108 
perwholesale1 34 0.0275 0.0116 0.0017 0.0520 
perretail1 34 0.0998 0.0175 0.0638 0.1475 
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Table 5 (con.): Tennessee Low-Spending* Summary Statistics 
2000 Demographic, School, and Industry Variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
perbelowpov 34 0.1627 0.0399 0.0744 0.2910 
totalpop 34 18052 13740 2205 62315 
medhhincome 34 30351 4207 21587 45556 
perblack 34 0.1015 0.1326 0.0000 0.5117 
pernotwhbl 34 0.0267 0.0226 0.0064 0.1406 
perrural 34 0.6907 0.3231 0.0177 1.0000 
perrentocc 34 0.2597 0.0846 0.1232 0.4607 
per12thorless 34 0.3275 0.0431 0.2486 0.4148 
per2064 34 0.5843 0.0284 0.5048 0.6319 
per65up 34 0.1481 0.0333 0.0852 0.2503 
puptotexp 34 5577 1122 4659 10970 
perprivenroll 34 5.0412 2.1507 1.4000 9.8000 
unemprate 34 0.0628 0.0257 0.0275 0.1490 
perag1 34 0.0296 0.0180 0.0000 0.0679 
pertrans1 34 0.0563 0.0135 0.0379 0.1015 
perconstruct1 34 0.0807 0.0229 0.0360 0.1375 
permanufac1 34 0.3032 0.0614 0.1460 0.4613 
perinfo1 34 0.0140 0.0087 0.0000 0.0419 
perfin1 34 0.0363 0.0116 0.0176 0.0780 
perprofess1 34 0.0397 0.0152 0.0162 0.0766 
peredhealth1 34 0.1660 0.0334 0.1237 0.2527 
perartsfood1 34 0.0545 0.0260 0.0265 0.1785 
perotherserve1 34 0.0417 0.0096 0.0148 0.0648 
perpublicadmin1 34 0.0371 0.0143 0.0147 0.0800 
perwholesale1 34 0.0301 0.0119 0.0102 0.0589 
perretail1 34 0.1108 0.0199 0.0800 0.1478 
 
All data are from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses with the exception of school finance data, which is from the 
NCES Longitudinal School District Fiscal-Nonfiscal File, Fiscal Years 1990 and 2000 
*Low spending districts are those in the lowest quartile of districts ranked by 1990 total expenditure per pupil 
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Table 6: Kentucky Poor* Summary Statistics 
1990 Demographic, School, and Industry Variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
perbelowpov 44 0.3609 0.0590 0.2893 0.5525 
totalpop 44 12283 8947 1122 43586 
medhhincome 44 18393 2805 10950 24113 
perblack 44 0.0227 0.0421 0.0000 0.2048 
pernotwhbl 44 0.0035 0.0044 0.0000 0.0267 
perrural 44 0.7990 0.3483 0.0000 1.0000 
perrentocc 44 0.2894 0.1071 0.1819 0.6306 
per12thorless 44 0.5092 0.0679 0.3174 0.6261 
per2064 44 0.5550 0.0167 0.4801 0.5848 
per65up 44 0.1356 0.0347 0.0869 0.2579 
puptotexp 44 4167 619 3340 7458 
perprivenroll 44 2.8068 2.4647 0.0000 14.8000 
unemprate 44 0.1527 0.0412 0.0806 0.2548 
perag1 44 0.1228 0.0905 0.0011 0.3559 
pertrans1 44 0.0558 0.0173 0.0178 0.0949 
perconstruct1 44 0.0681 0.0329 0.0115 0.1875 
permanufac1 44 0.1477 0.1074 0.0205 0.3492 
perinfo1 44 0.0259 0.0108 0.0060 0.0504 
perfin1 44 0.0313 0.0114 0.0030 0.0691 
perprofess1 44 0.0597 0.0136 0.0298 0.0898 
peredhealth1 44 0.1953 0.0622 0.1146 0.3842 
perartsfood1 44 0.0694 0.0159 0.0440 0.1100 
perotherserve1 44 0.0324 0.0068 0.0144 0.0457 
perpublicadmin1 44 0.0434 0.0176 0.0215 0.1195 
perwholesale1 44 0.0244 0.0135 0.0002 0.0689 
perretail1 44 0.1238 0.0317 0.0797 0.2105 
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Table 6 (con.): Kentucky Poor* Summary Statistics 
2000 Demographic, School, and Industry Variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
perbelowpov 44 0.3035 0.0589 0.1753 0.4538 
totalpop 44 12681 8982 1275 42440 
medhhincome 44 20501 2870 15034 27800 
perblack 44 0.0273 0.0539 0.0000 0.3016 
pernotwhbl 44 0.0148 0.0101 0.0039 0.0515 
perrural 44 0.7609 0.3499 0.0054 1.0000 
perrentocc 44 0.2674 0.1041 0.1400 0.5513 
per12thorless 44 0.4089 0.0660 0.2333 0.4980 
per2064 44 0.5911 0.0246 0.5024 0.6300 
per65up 44 0.1336 0.0283 0.0724 0.2271 
puptotexp 44 7120 1138 5681 12971 
perprivenroll 44 4.8614 2.9800 0.5000 13.9000 
unemprate 44 0.1014 0.0267 0.0585 0.1765 
perag1 44 0.0698 0.0497 0.0000 0.1948 
pertrans1 44 0.0536 0.0166 0.0252 0.0878 
perconstruct1 44 0.0745 0.0268 0.0202 0.1643 
permanufac1 44 0.1598 0.0987 0.0193 0.3733 
perinfo1 44 0.0193 0.0104 0.0000 0.0470 
perfin1 44 0.0316 0.0127 0.0168 0.0731 
perprofess1 44 0.0382 0.0120 0.0136 0.0668 
peredhealth1 44 0.2469 0.0626 0.1333 0.4207 
perartsfood1 44 0.0574 0.0175 0.0256 0.1259 
perotherserve1 44 0.0438 0.0119 0.0193 0.0741 
perpublicadmin1 44 0.0516 0.0226 0.0074 0.1214 
perwholesale1 44 0.0227 0.0103 0.0091 0.0490 
perretail1 44 0.1290 0.0287 0.0826 0.2048 
 
All data are from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses with the exception of school finance data, which is from the 
NCES Longitudinal School District Fiscal-Nonfiscal File, Fiscal Years 1990 and 2000 
*Poor districts are those ranked in the highest quartile of 1990 percent of households below poverty 
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Table 7: Tennessee Poor* Summary Statistics 
1990 Demographic, School, and Industry Variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
perbelowpov 34 0.2520 0.0445 0.2042 0.4005 
totalpop 34 29934 102851 2426 610337 
medhhincome 34 23495 2965 15883 30465 
perblack 34 0.1308 0.1693 0.0000 0.5488 
pernotwhbl 34 0.0046 0.0029 0.0000 0.0114 
perrural 34 0.5539 0.4615 0.0000 1.0000 
perrentocc 34 0.3098 0.1035 0.1756 0.4885 
per12thorless 34 0.4565 0.0580 0.2833 0.5557 
per2064 34 0.5590 0.0260 0.5074 0.6069 
per65up 34 0.1596 0.0380 0.1076 0.2496 
puptotexp 34 3929 628 2869 5783 
perprivenroll 34 2.8412 3.0347 0.2000 14.8000 
unemprate 34 0.0957 0.0289 0.0536 0.2015 
perag1 34 0.0380 0.0260 0.0020 0.0981 
pertrans1 34 0.0455 0.0142 0.0267 0.0898 
perconstruct1 34 0.0671 0.0224 0.0248 0.1099 
permanufac1 34 0.3063 0.0602 0.1201 0.4485 
perinfo1 34 0.0370 0.0089 0.0221 0.0688 
perfin1 34 0.0353 0.0107 0.0179 0.0609 
perprofess1 34 0.0496 0.0115 0.0226 0.0757 
peredhealth1 34 0.1503 0.0341 0.0909 0.2360 
perartsfood1 34 0.0627 0.0152 0.0365 0.1010 
perotherserve1 34 0.0292 0.0085 0.0168 0.0499 
perpublicadmin1 34 0.0449 0.0241 0.0193 0.1320 
perwholesale1 34 0.0281 0.0116 0.0017 0.0575 
perretail1 34 0.1062 0.0220 0.0666 0.1681 
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Table 7 (con.): Tennessee Poor* Summary Statistics 
2000 Demographic, School, and Industry Variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
perbelowpov 34 0.2035 0.0401 0.1248 0.2941 
totalpop 34 33126 109375 2380 649845 
medhhincome 34 26471 3957 18938 40155 
perblack 34 0.1368 0.1779 0.0000 0.6120 
pernotwhbl 34 0.0203 0.0109 0.0032 0.0573 
perrural 34 0.5693 0.4164 0.0008 1.0000 
perrentocc 34 0.3049 0.1084 0.1579 0.4968 
per12thorless 34 0.3618 0.0468 0.2470 0.4429 
per2064 34 0.5822 0.0335 0.5048 0.6619 
per65up 34 0.1551 0.0415 0.1053 0.2763 
puptotexp 34 6044 1633 4521 13037 
perprivenroll 34 5.4971 4.4396 0.0000 25.9000 
unemprate 34 0.0731 0.0244 0.0384 0.1490 
perag1 34 0.0281 0.0190 0.0021 0.0777 
pertrans1 34 0.0537 0.0163 0.0296 0.1141 
perconstruct1 34 0.0815 0.0289 0.0360 0.1456 
permanufac1 34 0.2712 0.0528 0.1020 0.3717 
perinfo1 34 0.0142 0.0088 0.0030 0.0419 
perfin1 34 0.0362 0.0133 0.0079 0.0612 
perprofess1 34 0.0430 0.0201 0.0132 0.0944 
peredhealth1 34 0.1734 0.0305 0.1186 0.2295 
perartsfood1 34 0.0677 0.0336 0.0265 0.1785 
perotherserve1 34 0.0443 0.0134 0.0173 0.0737 
perpublicadmin1 34 0.0439 0.0223 0.0128 0.1360 
perwholesale1 34 0.0272 0.0101 0.0136 0.0519 
perretail1 34 0.1156 0.0196 0.0800 0.1657 
 
All data are from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses with the exception of school finance data, which is from the 
NCES Longitudinal School District Fiscal-Nonfiscal File, Fiscal Years 1990 and 2000 
*Poor districts are those ranked in the highest quartile of 1990 percent of households below poverty 
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Classification Low-Spending Districts Poor Districts Low-Spending Districts Poor Districts
Phase 1 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 2
ky 0.018 0.011 0.019 0.017
(3.31)** -1.47 (3.27)** (2.48)*
post 0.021 0.012 0.026 0.009
(2.94)** -1.55 (3.29)** -1.11
interact 0 0.003 -0.003 0.001
-0.01 -0.36 -0.53 -0.11
lnmedhhinc -0.228 -0.279 -0.224 -0.273
(10.74)** (13.82)** (10.53)** (12.92)**
perblack 0.011 0.05 0.001 0.046
-0.48 (2.48)* -0.05 (2.12)*
pernotwhbl -0.108 -0.49 -0.048 -0.373
-0.94 -1.57 -0.43 -1.21
perrural 0.025 0.008 0.015 0.011
(3.04)** -0.8 -1.79 -1.06
perrentocc 0.193 0.134 0.16 0.126
(5.45)** (3.40)** (4.37)** (3.13)**
per12thorless 0.106 0.154 0.11 0.126
(2.37)* (3.27)** (2.27)* (2.53)*
per2064 -0.094 -0.33 -0.205 -0.311
-0.79 (2.37)* -1.46 (2.14)*
per65up -0.341 -0.582 -0.39 -0.525
(3.47)** (6.62)** (3.78)** (6.62)**
perprivenroll 0 0.001 -0.001 0.001
-1.07 -1.75 -1.51 -0.75
unemprate 0.372 0.188 0.409 0.196
(4.14)** (3.03)** (4.36)** (2.97)**
perag1dum 0.005 0
-1.53 -0.03
pertrans1dum -0.001 0.007
-0.23 -1.81
perconstruct1dum 0.003 0.007
-0.86 -1.72
permanufac1dum 0 0.0
-0.06 -0.97
perinfo1dum 0.002 0.003
-0.55 -0.75
perfin1dum 0.002 0.004
-0.56 -0.78
perprofess1dum 0.003 0.01
-0.96 (2.29)*
peredhealth1dum 0.009 0.009
-1.91 (2.22)*
perartsfood1dum 0 0.0
0 -0
perotherserve1dum -0.004 -0.003
-1.13 -0.69
perpublicadmin1dum 0.006 0.008
-1.23 (2.01)*
perwholesale1dum 0.007 0.001
(2.36)* -0.31
perretail1dum -0.002 -0.005
-0.41 -1.09
Constant 2.473 3.193 2.499 3.11
(10.00)** (13.39)** (10.54)** (13.12)**
Observations 156 156 156 156
R-squared 0.94 0.93 0.95 0.94
Dependent Variable: perbelowpov; Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 8: Primary Results (Full)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Classification
interact -0.012 0.012 -0.013 0.018 -0.015 0.009 -0.014 0.016
95% Confidence Intervals for the estimated coefficient of the variable of interest; Dependent Variable: perbelowpov
Phase 2
95% Confidence Interval 95% Confidence Interval 95% Confidence Interval 95% Confidence Interval
Table 9: Confidence Intervals for Primary Results (Full)
Low-Spending Districts Poor Districts Low-Spending Districts Poor Districts
Phase 1 Phase 1 Phase 2
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 Classification Lowest Quartile of Median Household Income Lowest Quartile of Median Household Value
Phase 2 Phase 2
ky 0.002 0.019
-0.21 (3.22)**
post 0.026 0.022
(2.90)** (2.04)*
interact 0.007 -0.006
-0.93 -0.84
lnmedhhinc -0.281 -0.293
(9.89)** (12.20)**
perblack 0.004 0.036
-0.13 -1.21
pernotwhbl -0.171 -0.003
-1.09 -0.01
perrural 0.021 0.004
(2.31)* -0.34
perrentocc 0.146 0.06
(3.58)** -0.99
per12thorless 0.158 0.076
(2.62)** -1.25
per2064 -0.592 -0.428
(4.18)** (2.48)*
per65up -0.544 -0.548
(6.35)** (4.88)**
perprivenroll 0.001 0.001
-0.67 -0.7
unemprate 0.256 0.255
(3.93)** (4.29)**
perag1dum -0.006 -0.002
-1.21 -0.37
pertrans1dum 0.004 0
-0.82 -0.09
perconstruct1dum 0.005 0.009
-1.29 (2.01)*
permanufac1dum -0.003 0.002
-0.46 -0.3
perinfo1dum 0.006 0.003
-1.3 -0.67
perfin1dum -0.003 0.001
-0.39 -0.21
perprofess1dum 0.007 0.007
-1.24 -1.35
peredhealth1dum 0.002 0.005
-0.47 -0.93
perartsfood1dum 0.005 -0.003
-0.98 -0.54
perotherserve1dum -0.006 -0.001
-1.29 -0.29
perpublicadmin1dum 0.012 0.012
(2.47)* (2.85)**
perwholesale1dum -0.006 0.004
-1.31 -0.99
perretail1dum -0.007 -0.007
-1.47 -1.39
Constant 3.331 3.412
(10.85)** (11.59)**
Observations 156 156
R-squared 0.93 0.95
Dependent Variable: perbelowpov; Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 10: Median Income and Median Housing Unit Value Results
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 Classification 10th Percentile Low-Spending 2nd Spending Quartile 3rd Spending Quartile Highest Spending Quartile
Phase 2 Phase 2 Phase 2 Phase 2
ky 0.023 0.018 0.015 0.003
-1.82 (3.57)** (2.75)** -0.32
post 0.022 0.01 0.015 0.011
(2.03)* -1.21 -1.55 -1.22
interact 0.004 -0.006 0.004 0.006
-0.33 -0.9 -0.47 -0.66
lnmedhhinc -0.226 -0.242 -0.202 -0.245
(5.68)** (10.62)** (8.05)** (6.77)**
perblack 0.012 0.085 0.026 0.009
-0.28 (2.64)** -0.57 -0.46
pernotwhbl 0.045 0.262 0.323 -0.048
-0.21 -0.79 -0.94 -0.25
perrural 0.027 0.015 0.006 0.002
(2.39)* -1.28 -0.47 -0.16
perrentocc 0.18 0.168 0.059 0.025
(2.36)* (3.18)** -1.14 -0.61
per12thorless 0.197 0.175 0.188 0.04
(2.68)* (3.81)** (3.72)** -0.58
per2064 0.121 -0.044 -0.414 -0.547
-0.55 -0.36 (2.61)* (4.44)**
per65up -0.186 -0.554 -0.564 -0.625
-1.04 (6.99)** (5.21)** (5.98)**
perprivenroll -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
-0.86 -1.62 -1.85 -1.41
unemprate 0.377 0.152 0.264 0.3
-1.68 -1.69 (3.93)** (2.64)**
perag1dum 0.007 -0.003 -0.004 0.006
-1.01 -0.99 -0.73 -1.1
pertrans1dum 0.001 0.004 0.002 -0.006
-0.11 -1.22 -0.43 -0.87
perconstruct1dum 0.008 0.008 -0.003 0
-1.03 -1.94 -0.76 0
permanufac1dum -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 0
-0.33 -0.84 -0.7 -0.03
perinfo1dum 0 0.006 0.008 -0.001
-0.07 -1.59 -1.79 -0.24
perfin1dum 0.017 0.002 -0.002 0
-1.83 -0.55 -0.31 -0.1
perprofess1dum 0 0.001 0.01 0.013
-0.06 -0.28 (2.49)* (2.09)*
peredhealth1dum 0.01 0.003 0.012 0.023
-1.09 -0.69 (2.52)* (3.94)**
perartsfood1dum 0.005 0.004 -0.001 -0.004
-0.79 -1.05 -0.3 -0.75
perotherserve1dum -0.008 -0.001 0.002 -0.005
-1.34 -0.19 -0.56 -0.91
perpublicadmin1dum 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.002
-0.22 -0.78 -0.63 -0.47
perwholesale1dum 0.001 -0.004 0.001 0
-0.23 -1.3 -0.11 -0.06
perretail1dum -0.009 0 -0.004 -0.003
-1.38 -0.07 -0.99 -0.54
Constant 2.261 2.616 2.455 3.043
(4.55)** (9.74)** (8.48)** (6.83)**
Observations 64 156 156 154
R-squared 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.93
Table 11: Spending Results
Dependent Variable: perbelowpov; Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
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Classification 10th Percentile Poor 2nd Poorest Quartile 2nd Richest Quartile Richest Quartile
Phase 2 Phase 2 Phase 2 Phase 2
ky -0.005 0.029 0.02 0.015
-0.31 (4.98)** (5.18)** (3.62)**
post 0.017 -0.009 0.006 0.019
-1.12 -1.45 -0.96 (3.06)**
interact 0.021 0.001 -0.011 -0.008
-1.39 -0.13 (2.12)* -1.58
lnmedhhinc -0.303 -0.153 -0.137 -0.099
(7.38)** (6.14)** (6.63)** (4.88)**
perblack 0.015 -0.028 0.016 0.094
-0.35 -1.09 -0.56 (2.82)**
pernotwhbl -1.041 0.279 0.254 -0.163
-1.67 (2.27)* -1.23 -0.91
perrural -0.018 -0.002 0.017 -0.003
-1.08 -0.21 (2.60)* -0.4
perrentocc 0.197 0.021 0.112 0.06
(3.21)** -0.55 (3.91)** -1.67
per12thorless 0.268 0.054 0.115 0.092
(2.26)* -1.08 (3.79)** (2.07)*
per2064 -0.49 -0.312 -0.007 -0.048
-1.97 (2.42)* -0.06 -0.74
per65up -0.351 -0.272 -0.093 -0.157
Table 12: Poverty Results
Dependent Variable: perbelowpov; Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
 
-1.56 (2.70)** -1.02 (2.74)**
perprivenroll 0.004 0 0 -0.001
-1.7 -0.8 -0.94 (3.22)**
unemprate 0.204 0.049 0.162 0.366
-1.97 -0.67 (2.22)* (3.75)**
perag1dum 0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.001
-0.2 -0.69 -0.98 -0.24
pertrans1dum 0.008 -0.005 0.002 -0.003
-0.93 -1.89 -0.66 -0.77
perconstruct1dum 0.013 -0.002 -0.003 0.003
-1.95 -0.57 -1.16 -0.94
permanufac1dum 0.006 0 -0.006 0.006
-0.63 -0.01 -1.47 -1.55
perinfo1dum -0.004 0.005 -0.001 -0.001
-0.48 -1.57 -0.37 -0.28
perfin1dum -0.023 0.003 0.004 -0.002
(2.20)* -0.91 -1.06 -0.5
perprofess1dum -0.001 0.009 0.001 0.007
-0.16 (2.43)* -0.51 (2.05)*
peredhealth1dum 0.015 0.006 0.003 0.006
-1.85 -1.6 -0.87 (2.02)*
perartsfood1dum 0.002 0.001 -0.004 0.003
-0.28 -0.19 -1.28 -0.96
perotherserve1dum -0.005 -0.006 0.007 0.001
-0.73 -1.67 (2.63)** -0.18
perpublicadmin1dum 0.009 0.002 0 -0.002
-0.89 -0.41 -0.07 -0.49
perwholesale1dum 0.006 -0.002 -0.001 0.003
-0.51 -0.88 -0.3 -0.75
perretail1dum -0.002 0 -0.001 0
-0.28 -0.06 -0.47 -0.11
Constant 3.422 1.933 1.498 1.12
(8.17)** (6.27)** (6.09)** (4.81)**
Observations 60 154 158 154
R-squared 0.96 0.86 0.78 0.83
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Chart 2: 
 
 
TN Total Expenditures Per Pupil (2000)
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KY Total Expenditures Per Pupil (1990)
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TN Total Expenditures Per Pupil (1990)
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